In comments carried by China Daily, Fu Zhengnan, a researcher at the PLA's Academy of Military Science, argues that the geography and demographics of Taiwan work against the defining feature that has made HIMARS famous on other battlefields-its ability to "shoot and scoot" across open terrain before an enemy can respond. Fu notes that the system was designed to exploit wide deserts and plains, whereas Taiwan's narrow, mountainous landmass and dense urbanization sharply constrain where the launchers can safely operate without exposing civilians or revealing firing positions.
The US$11.1 billion arms package approved by Washington in December places HIMARS at the center of a broader effort to enlarge Taiwan's long-range, precision-strike arsenal, including guided rockets and missiles capable of hitting targets on the Chinese coast and in the Strait. For Beijing, however, the deal is portrayed less as a boost to Taiwan's deterrence than as proof that Taipei is doubling down on what Chinese media describe as a "porcupine" strategy that will still be unable to withstand a concentrated PLA campaign.
Fu contends that on a small island under continuous surveillance by satellites, drones and other sensors, large tracked or wheeled launchers are far easier to detect than on more spacious battlefields. In his view, the result is that HIMARS becomes a set of exposed spikes on an animal that cannot run or hide, with crews facing great difficulty in spotting or reacting to incoming threats in time once a high-intensity conflict begins.
By contrast, the PLA's own long-range rocket artillery is depicted as operating from deep, protected positions along China's coast, with longer range, higher volume of fire and more sustainable logistics. This allows Chinese forces, according to Fu, to mass salvos against known or suspected HIMARS positions while keeping their own launchers further from counter-battery fire, tipping any cross-Strait duel in Beijing's favor.
The critique lands at a moment when Taiwan's official defense strategy is being reshaped around a more explicitly asymmetric posture often described as a "porcupine strategy," which seeks to make invasion prohibitively costly rather than to match the PLA system-for-system. Central to that concept are mobile, survivable systems-coastal anti-ship missiles, air defenses, mines and long-range rockets-that can endure initial strikes and continue to exact attrition on any landing force.
HIMARS is intended to plug into that layered denial architecture by providing rapidly deployable, truck-mounted launchers able to fire precision rockets and ATACMS-class missiles from dispersed positions around the island. Taiwanese sources describe efforts to base the systems in small, scattered units, shifting them frequently along the road network and using camouflage, decoys and hardened shelters to preserve launchers through an opening barrage.
Supporters of the program argue that even a modest number of surviving HIMARS launchers, properly networked with radar and unmanned systems, could pose a serious threat to PLA amphibious shipping, staging areas and nearby bases-giving Taipei a potent tool for sea denial and counter-landing operations. Exercises in 2025 have already showcased live firings by newly formed HIMARS units, signaling that Taipei sees the system as a key enabler of its evolving deterrence posture.
Yet the China Daily article highlights a broader debate over whether highly visible, high-value platforms like HIMARS truly align with the logic of deep asymmetry that many Western and Taiwanese strategists advocate for the island's defense. Critics on both sides of the Strait contend that resources might be better spent on larger numbers of smaller, cheaper, and more easily concealed systems-such as additional coastal missiles, drones and loitering munitions-that are harder to track and destroy in bulk.
For now, the "porcupine in a glass box" analogy neatly captures Beijing's narrative that US hardware cannot fundamentally alter the military balance in the Strait, even as Taiwan and its partners seek to stitch systems like HIMARS into a wider web of area-denial capabilities. Whether those rockets become easy prey under PLA firepower or a resilient thorn in any invasion plan will depend less on their technical specifications than on how effectively Taipei can disperse, conceal and sustain them in the face of sustained pressure.
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